Deux voies, un même projet.

Nous sollicitons une initiative législative : selon OPSI, les éléments réunis justifient déjà de demander à l’Assemblée nationale de constituer l’Ordre par une loi particulière, suivant l’article 24 du Code des professions, sans écarter les facteurs de l’article 25. Les données empiriques manquantes que le registre doit précisément permettre de recueillir ne sont pas disponibles actuellement : leur absence ne devrait pas rendre sa création circulairement impossible. Nous poursuivons en parallèle la démarche administrative normale, en collaboration avec les instances en place, et une demande au législateur de procéder sans attendre son aboutissement : deux voies vers Québec, la 20 et la 40, portant le même projet; la première qui aboutit permet d’avancer.

Two routes, one proposal.

We are seeking a legislative initiative: in OPSI’s assessment, the material assembled already supports asking the National Assembly to establish the Order by a special Act under section 24 of the Professional Code, without setting aside the section 25 factors. Missing empirical data that the registry is intended to collect are not currently available; their absence should not make its creation circularly impossible. We are pursuing the normal administrative process in collaboration with existing institutions while also asking the legislature to proceed without waiting for that process to conclude: two routes to Québec City, Highways 20 and 40, carrying the same proposal; the first successful route enables progress.

Section 25 · Professional Code

Evidence file —
Section 25.

Five factors. External sources. Explicit limitations.

This page has one purpose: to examine, factor by factor, whether the professional activities proposed by OPSI have the characteristics set out in section 25 of the Professional Code.

It systematically distinguishes facts established by external sources, OPSI analysis, information that is not centralized under the current regime, and questions that genuinely remain to be decided.

Two steps that should not be confused.

The Office’s Guide asks for reliable indications that reasonably support concern about a real risk, followed by analysis of its probability, severity, causal link and existing mitigation measures. This preliminary analysis does not replace section 25: the five statutory factors remain the structure of this page.

Professional Code Office guide

Established fact — external sourceOPSI analysisQuestion to validateNon-centralized data

Section 25 · Factor 1

Required knowledge

Do the activities proposed by OPSI actually require sufficiently specialized knowledge to justify professional oversight?

Established fact — external source

Standardized inspections, testing and interpretation.

RBQ documentation refers, among other things, to CAN/ULC-S536 for inspection and testing of fire alarm systems and to NFPA 25 for water-based fire protection systems. It distinguishes routine checks from in-depth inspections and tests that must be carried out by a specialized firm and documented in a complete report.

The fire safety plan must, for its part, describe in particular the type, location and operation of fire safety installations, with relevant diagrams. Integrated tests under CAN/ULC-S1001 address verification and documentation of interconnections between fire protection and life safety systems.

Sources: Régie du bâtiment du Québec; UL Standards & Engagement.View source S536 — RBQ S1001 — ULC

Established fact — external source

Systems that interact.

Integrated testing specifically addresses interconnections between systems. Depending on the building, the analysis may involve alarms, sprinklers, fire pumps, standpipes, elevators, ventilation, smoke control, emergency power and other interconnected functions.

Source: CAN/ULC-S1001, UL Standards & Engagement.View source

Established fact — external source

The fire safety plan is a technical document.

Québec regulation requires an applicable fire safety plan to describe emergency measures and, where applicable, the type, location and operation of fire safety installations, including diagrams. It must also be reviewed to account for changes to the building.

Source: Safety Code and RBQ explanatory guide.View source

Documented example — Alexis-Nihon

Established fact — external source

A system cannot be understood merely by looking at its components.

The National Research Council Canada technical report describes the water-supply difficulties encountered during the 1986 response and considers several possible explanations, including a closed or partly closed valve, an obstruction, use of the wrong fire department connection, or a system-supply problem.

NRC notes that the applicable requirements included periodic system inspections, weekly inspection of certain valves and weekly start-up of fire pumps. It indicates that inspections in accordance with the requirements would likely have identified certain possible failures before the fire, including a closed valve or a non-operating fire pump.

Source: NRC, A Report on the Alexis Nihon Office Complex Fire, 1987.View source

OPSI analysis

Alexis-Nihon illustrates that inspecting a fire protection system requires more than the physical presence of an inspector: the practitioner must understand how the system actually works, know what to check, recognize a potentially critical deficiency and understand its consequences.

Established fact — external source

The targeted activities do not consist only of visually confirming that equipment is present. Several require the application of technical standards, testing procedures, an understanding of system interactions and professional interpretation of results.

Section 25 · Factor 2

Autonomy and difficulty of evaluation

Can the client reasonably verify for themselves whether the professional work was performed correctly?

Can a non-specialist owner determine whether a S536 test was carried out correctly?

Whether a fire pump test is valid?

Whether a standpipe actually provides the expected flow?

Whether the fire department connection identified actually serves the stated system?

Whether all S1001 interconnections have been tested?

Whether a PDSI correctly describes how the installations operate?

Whether a deficiency constitutes a non-compliance and, if so, how it should be classified?

OPSI analysis

The report becomes the interface of trust.

For several of the proposed activities, the recipient of the service has neither the training, instruments nor standards knowledge needed to reproduce the tests and independently verify the practitioner’s conclusions.

The recipient therefore generally receives a technical report and must largely rely on the method used and the judgment of the person who signs it.

Established fact — external source

Alexis-Nihon: a document can exist without being technically sufficient.

NRC notes that a Fire Safety Plan existed, but that the operation of the tower standpipe system was not clearly indicated in it. The report adds that someone truly familiar with the system configuration might have helped firefighters resolve the water-supply problem sooner.

Source: NRC, Alexis-Nihon report.View source

OPSI analysis

Assessing the actual quality of a fire safety plan or a description of complex systems requires the knowledge needed to validate its content.

Non-centralized data

Aucune source provinciale centralisée permettant de relier systématiquement un acte technique, son signataire, sa qualification et une réévaluation ultérieure de cet acte n’a été identifiée dans les sources publiques consultées à ce jour. Il n’est donc pas possible d’en déduire un taux provincial représentatif d’erreurs professionnelles. Cette indisponibilité n’est pas utilisée comme preuve d’erreur.

No centralized province-wide source has been identified in the public sources reviewed to date that systematically links a technical act, its signer, their qualification and a later reassessment of that act. A representative province-wide professional error rate therefore cannot be inferred from the information currently centralized. This unavailability is not used as evidence of error.

Section 25 · Factor 3

Personal nature of the relationship and particular trust

Do people using these services place particular trust in the practitioner?

OPSI analysis

The relationship between a fire safety practitioner and a client generally does not have the same personal character as certain relationships in health, law or property administration.

Significant trust is nevertheless placed in the practitioner’s conclusions because the owner, manager or operator may have to make safety decisions based on expertise they do not personally possess.

Report declaring a system functionalConclusion concerning a fire pumpCAN/ULC-S536 reportValidation of a fire safety planClassification of a deficiencyConfirmation of a correction

OPSI analysis

The trust factor exists mainly because of the knowledge asymmetry between the practitioner and the person relying on the conclusions.

Analyse nuancéeUne confiance technique, sans assimiler la relation à celle des professions de santé.

Ce facteur est documenté principalement sous l’angle de la confiance accordée à une conclusion technique que le destinataire ne peut vérifier lui-même. Le caractère relationnel est moins prononcé que dans certaines professions de santé, ce qui est expressément reconnu.

Nuanced analysisTechnical reliance without equating the relationship to health professions.

This factor is documented mainly through the reliance placed on a technical conclusion that the recipient cannot independently verify. The relational dimension is less pronounced than in some health professions, which is expressly acknowledged.

Méthode de preuve

Évaluer un risque sans inventer
un taux qui n’existe pas.

Le taux provincial représentatif d’erreurs professionnelles n’est pas reconstructible à partir des données actuellement centralisées. Cela n’empêche pas d’évaluer le risque; cela impose de préciser la méthode utilisée.

Méthode de l’Office

Le Preliminary analysis guide for requests for professional oversight demande des indications fiables permettant raisonnablement de craindre un risque réel, recommande de consulter les personnes et organismes qui connaissent le milieu, prévoit que la probabilité peut être estimée de façon qualitative ou quantitative, demande d’examiner le lien causal et les mesures d’atténuation existantes, puis propose une matrice qualitative de risque.

Source : Office des professions du Québec, Guide d’analyse préliminaire.Office guide

Exposition

Le nombre de bâtiments, de systèmes, d’inspections et de personnes qui dépendent de conclusions techniques établit l’ampleur de l’exposition. Il ne mesure pas un taux de faute.

Complexité

Les normes NFPA et CAN/ULC, les interactions entre systèmes, les essais, mesures et interprétations montrent que les actes ciblés exigent des connaissances spécialisées.

Déficiences observées

Les inspections officielles documentent des déficiences réelles. Elles montrent que les situations à détecter ne sont pas purement théoriques, sans permettre d’attribuer ces déficiences à des fautes professionnelles.

Cas sentinelles

Des événements documentés permettent d’analyser comment une défaillance d’un système, une information inadéquate ou une connaissance insuffisante peut contribuer à des conséquences importantes, sans imputer une faute que la source officielle n’établit pas.

Asymétrie d’information

Le client qui reçoit une conclusion technique ne peut généralement ni refaire l’essai ni reproduire lui-même l’analyse nécessaire pour vérifier le rapport.

Surveillance professionnelle transversale

Les mécanismes actuels ne réunissent pas uniformément, pour toutes les personnes qui posent les actes ciblés, admission individuelle, maintien de la compétence, inspection professionnelle, déontologie, syndic, discipline et continuité entre employeurs.

Le point méthodologique central

OPSI ne substitue pas une hypothèse à une statistique absente. Il utilise plusieurs catégories indépendantes d’information pour déterminer si le risque est suffisamment crédible et sérieux pour justifier l’examen d’un encadrement professionnel.

Evidence method

Assessing risk without inventing
a rate that does not exist.

A representative province-wide rate of professional errors cannot be reconstructed from the information currently centralized. That does not prevent risk assessment; it requires the method to be explicit.

Office method

The Office des professions’ Preliminary Analysis Guide for Professional Oversight Requests asks for reliable indications that reasonably support concern about a real risk, recommends consultation with people and organizations familiar with the field, allows probability to be estimated qualitatively or quantitatively, requires examination of the causal link and existing mitigation measures, and proposes a qualitative risk matrix.

Source: Office des professions du Québec, Preliminary Analysis Guide.Office guide

Exposure

The number of buildings, systems, inspections and people relying on technical conclusions establishes the scale of exposure. It does not measure a fault rate.

Complexity

NFPA and CAN/ULC standards, system interactions, testing, measurement and interpretation show that the targeted acts require specialized knowledge.

Observed deficiencies

Official inspections document real deficiencies. They show that the conditions practitioners must detect are not merely theoretical, without allowing those deficiencies to be attributed to professional fault.

Sentinel cases

Documented events make it possible to analyze how a system failure, inadequate information or insufficient knowledge can contribute to serious consequences, without imputing a fault that the official source does not establish.

Information asymmetry

A client receiving a technical conclusion generally cannot repeat the test or reproduce the analysis needed to verify the report independently.

Cross-cutting professional oversight

Current mechanisms do not uniformly combine, for all people performing the targeted acts, individual admission, competence maintenance, professional inspection, ethics, syndic, discipline and continuity across employers.

The central methodological point

OPSI does not substitute an assumption for a missing statistic. It uses several independent categories of information to determine whether the risk is sufficiently credible and serious to warrant examination of professional oversight.

Section 25 · Factor 4

Seriousness of harm in the absence of professional control

Could serious harm result from the fact that the practitioner’s competence or integrity is not controlled by an order?

The question is not simply: “Is fire dangerous?”

Professional activity→Undetected error or deficiency→Potential serious harm

4A · General seriousness

Fire risk can lead to serious consequences.

Data verified October 5, 2026.

Established fact — external source16 907reported fires · Québec · 202116 471reported fires · Québec · 2022

6,535 buildings damaged in 2021, including 475 commercial buildings; 6,769 in 2022, including 532 commercial buildings.

Source: Gouvernement du Québec, fire safety service data.View source

Established fact — external source308people injured on average each year in Québec≈ 27 000people evacuated on average each year

Source: Gouvernement du Québec, fire prevention campaign.View source

Established fact — external source34fire-caused deaths · Québec · 2024

Preliminary data from the Bureau du coroner used by the ministry in its 2024–2025 annual report.

Source: Ministère de la Sécurité publique, 2024–2025 Annual Management Report.View source

These statistics establish the general seriousness of fire risk. They do not show that fires, injuries or deaths are caused by the professionals targeted by OPSI. The connection with professional activities must be established separately.

4B · Observed deficiencies

Operation Vulcain — a targeted sample, not a province-wide frequency.

Established fact — external source

+500inspections

≈2 500non-compliances

20formal notices for cases deemed critical

In 2023, the SIM carried out these inspections in buildings identified through risk management as presenting priority risks.

À titre purement descriptif, près de 2 500 non-conformités pour plus de 500 inspections correspond à un ordre de grandeur d’environ 5 non-conformités constatées par inspection dans cet échantillon ciblé. Les 20 mises en demeure représentent environ 4 % du nombre annoncé d’inspections si l’on utilise 500 comme dénominateur minimal; ce pourcentage n’est pas un taux exact puisque le rapport indique « plus de 500 » inspections.

Limitation: ces bâtiments avaient été ciblés selon leur niveau de risque. Ces calculs ne constituent ni un taux provincial de non-conformité ni, surtout, un taux de faute professionnelle. Ils établissent seulement que des déficiences réelles, dont certaines critiques, sont effectivement observées dans certains ensembles de bâtiments à risque.

For descriptive purposes only, nearly 2,500 non-compliances across more than 500 inspections corresponds to an order of magnitude of about 5 non-compliances observed per inspection in this targeted sample. The 20 formal notices amount to about 4% of the announced inspection count if 500 is used as the minimum denominator; this is not an exact rate because the report states “more than 500” inspections.

Limit: these buildings were selected based on their risk level. These calculations are neither a province-wide non-compliance rate nor, especially, a professional fault rate. They only establish that real deficiencies, some critical, are in fact observed in certain sets of higher-risk buildings.

Source: Service de sécurité incendie de Montréal, 2023 Activity Report.View source

Established fact — external source

Actual inspections of targeted Québec buildings nevertheless identified a significant number of non-compliances, some serious enough to be classified as a non-compliance under documented action.

4C · Documented Québec cases

Connecting professional activity to a possible consequence.

OPSI deliberately limits its main file to Québec events. Investigation reports from other jurisdictions also document situations involving alarm systems, sprinklers, fire pumps, standpipes, fire department connections, means of egress, inspections and fire safety plans; they are not counted here as Québec evidence.

Case A — Alexis-Nihon

Established fact — external source

Water supply, standpipe system and system knowledge.

NRC documents a significant water pressure and flow problem during the response. It indicates that the delay in obtaining an adequate supply probably contributed significantly to the extent of the damage. The report examines several hypotheses without definitively selecting one: a closed or partly closed valve, an obstruction, use of the wrong fire department connection or another system problem.

The report also notes that existing inspection requirements would likely have revealed certain possible failures before the fire if they had been followed.

Primary source: National Research Council Canada, 1987.NRC report Current requirements — fire department connections

OPSI analysis

Some inspection activities concern equipment whose unavailability can substantially increase the consequences of a fire. The competence of the person inspecting and interpreting these installations is therefore directly related to public protection.

Strictly hypothetical application of the proposal:if an authorized person had identified a non-compliance reaching the serious-risk threshold and assigned it “under documented action” status because the handling was considered serious and credible, section 15 would have provided for an automatic change to “requiring action” status at the deadline in the absence of verified correction. The same situation could have been a non-compliance requiring action from the outset if no adequate handling had been established. This observation supports no conclusion about the outcome of the fire.

Case B — L’Isle-Verte

Established fact — external source

32 deaths in a private seniors’ residence.

The fire at the Résidence du Havre on January 23, 2014 caused 32 deaths. Subsequent government work explicitly links coroner recommendations to changes in the regulation of private seniors’ residences, including sprinkler requirements.

Sources: Gouvernement du Québec; documents following the coroner’s report.View source Sprinkler requirements

Established fact — external source

A deficiency in the layers of protection of a building housing vulnerable people can have catastrophic consequences.

OPSI analysis

Several of these layers — fire safety plans, alarm systems, suppression systems, inspection, training and procedures — correspond to functions the proposed professional field seeks to oversee. OPSI does not claim that a professional order would have prevented the 32 deaths.

Case C — Hélène Rowley Hotte Duceppe

Established fact — external source

An emergency procedure can reveal a critical vulnerability.

In 2019, Hélène Rowley Hotte Duceppe, age 93, left a private seniors’ residence after a general alarm, could not re-enter the building and died of hypothermia. The coroner notably recommended a resident count, exterior checks and a verification and re-entry procedure included in the emergency measures plan.

Source: Bureau du coroner, June 18, 2019.View source

OPSI does not claim that a professional order would necessarily have prevented this death.

OPSI analysis

This case shows that an event can reveal a weakness in a safety plan or procedure. A person professionally responsible for the fire safety plan must be able to identify that weakness, update the plan and, when the risk remains sufficiently serious, have obligations that do not depend exclusively on the client’s commercial wishes.

Case D — Old Montréal · 2023

Established fact — external source

A fire with major consequences, with the public inquiry still ongoing.

The SPVM reports that 22 people were present during the 2023 fire, which caused 7 deaths and 9 injuries. An accidental cause was ruled out by the police investigation. The coroner's public inquiry remains ongoing.

SPVM — 2023 Bureau du coroner

Caution: this case is presented only to illustrate the potential seriousness of a fire. Until the public inquiry is complete, it does not support attributing the deaths to a particular technical failure or professional error.

OPSI analysis

The 2023 case is a reminder that a building's protective functions can be critically important when a fire occurs. It does not, however, by itself establish that a particular inspection, report or professional act was deficient.

4D · Why professional control can change the risk

The intended mechanism is to interrupt the chain before harm occurs.

Critical safety activity↓Client unable to verify quality alone↓Potentially undetected error or deficiency↓Serious-risk non-compliance: under documented action where credible documented handling exists; requiring action where it does not, ceases or becomes insufficient↓Inadequate system or procedure during a fire↓Potential serious harm

Admission requirementsDuty of competenceContinuing educationProfessional inspectionEthicsIndividual accountabilityDisciplineMandatory reportingTraceabilityFollow-up

OPSI analysis

What mandatory reporting changes

Serious-risk threshold reached · handling assessed as serious and credible
ss. 27 and 30Applicable correction periodNo correction notice filed by an authorized person by the deadlineAutomatic change to “requiring action” status if no verified correction is filed by the deadline
s. 15Dashboard notice, traceability and follow-up of obligations
ss. 29 and 30

Section 17 treats “under documented action” and “requiring action” status as two states of the same serious-risk non-compliance. The “under documented action” classification requires immediate, serious, credible and documented handling; it changes to “requiring action” if that handling ceases or becomes insufficient, and automatically at the deadline if no verified correction has been filed. The owner has no declaration to make. The regulation under section 30 must set the criteria and may establish guidelines, grids and examples to frame that judgment.

The “under documented action” status remains open during the period as long as handling remains serious, credible and documented. If no verified correction exists by the deadline, the classification automatically becomes “requiring action”; it may also change earlier if the handling ceases or becomes manifestly insufficient.

Articles 27 à 32 Article 30

OPSI analysis

The case for professional oversight therefore does not rest only on the danger of fire. It rests on the fact that people exercise autonomous technical judgment over functions that can directly affect occupant safety while the recipient of the service may have difficulty independently assessing the quality of that judgment. Registry follow-up adds a corrective mechanism: a serious-risk non-compliance may remain a non-compliance under documented action while credible documented handling exists, but becomes a non-compliance requiring action if that handling is absent or if no verified correction is filed by the deadline.

Section 25 · Factor 5

Confidential nature of information

Do some proposed activities expose the practitioner to confidential information?

Established fact — external source

Some fire safety plans contain individualized information.

The regulation applicable to private seniors’ residences requires a fire safety plan to include a list of residents specifying, for each one, the measures to be taken to ensure safe evacuation, as well as certain contact information useful for emergency measures. This information must be kept up to date.

Source: Regulation respecting the certification of private seniors’ residences, section 21, Légis Québec.View source

Established fact — external source

Some activities related to fire safety plans expose the practitioner to information concerning identifiable individuals and their abilities or particular needs in an emergency.

This factor is not equally present in every type of mandate. Its scope varies with the activities performed.

Summary

State of the evidence — Section 25

This reading is neither an overall score nor a definitive legal conclusion. It distinguishes what is strongly documented, what is supported more cautiously, and what cannot be directly measured from the information currently centralized.

Factor

Evidence used

Status

1. Required knowledge

Standards, specialized tests, multiple systems, Alexis-Nihon.

Strongly documented

2. Autonomy and difficulty of evaluation

Specialized tests, technical reports, difficulty for the client to reproduce the work.

Fortement documenté sur l’asymétrie d’information et la difficulté de vérification indépendante; observations terrain additionnelles utiles, mais non nécessaires pour établir le principe.Strongly documented regarding information asymmetry and the difficulty of independent verification; additional field observations would be useful, but are not necessary to establish the principle.

3. Particular trust

Client reliance on specialized conclusions.

Documenté principalement sous l’angle de la confiance accordée à une conclusion technique que le destinataire ne peut vérifier lui-même. Le caractère relationnel est moins prononcé que dans certaines professions de santé, ce qui est expressément reconnu.Documented mainly through the reliance placed on a technical conclusion that the recipient cannot independently verify. The relational dimension is less pronounced than in some health professions, which is expressly acknowledged.

4. Seriousness of harm without professional control

Québec statistics, documented cases, existing mechanisms and analysis of the absence of cross-cutting professional oversight of the individual who performs and signs the targeted acts.

Gravité fortement documentée. L’existence d’un taux provincial représentatif d’erreurs professionnelles n’est pas mesurable à partir des données actuellement centralisées. La probabilité du risque est donc appréciée par un faisceau d’éléments convergents, conformément à l’approche qualitative admise par le Guide de l’Office.Severity is strongly documented. A representative province-wide professional error rate cannot be measured from the information currently centralized. Risk probability is therefore assessed through converging evidence, consistent with the qualitative approach permitted by the Office’s Guide.

5. Confidentiality

Individualized information contained in some fire safety plans, particularly in private seniors’ residences.

Documented for certain mandates

Section 26 · Professional Code

Section 26 — Why exclusive practice

Established fact — external source

Section 26 of the Professional Code provides that an exclusive right to practise may be granted only by statute and only where, having regard to the nature of the acts and the latitude in practice, protection of the public requires those acts to be performed by persons with the training and qualifications required for membership.

Source: Professional Code, section 26 — Légis Québec.View source

OPSI analysis

The title alone does not control the act.

Section 4 of the proposal protects the title “fire safety practitioner”. On its own, a reserved title would not prevent a non-member from performing the technical act. Under the OPSI proposal, however, potential harm arises from the quality of the act itself: an improperly performed test, a pump incorrectly declared compliant, or a fire safety plan approved without sufficient review.

Factor 2 of section 25 reinforces this logic: the owner or manager may find it difficult to assess the quality of the work and therefore does not choose between a “titled” and an “untitled” practitioner with equivalent technical information.

OPSI analysis

The risk extends beyond the parties to the contract.

The targeted activities concern building safety functions. An error may affect occupants, visitors or other people who are not parties to the contract between the client and the practitioner.

OPSI therefore takes the position that a reserved title alone would not sufficiently address the identified risk if the risk-bearing acts could continue to be performed in the same way by people not subject to the professional regime.

OPSI analysis

A deliberately circumscribed reservation

Section 8: periodic inspections and tests are reserved only where an applicable requirement requires them and the prescribed interval meets the stated threshold; verifications, inspections and tests required following installation, modification, replacement, repair or return to service are reserved regardless of that time threshold.
Section 10: the physical drafting of a fire safety plan is not reserved; only the professional approval contemplated by section 10 is reserved.
Section 11: organizing or conducting a fire or evacuation drill is not reserved.
Section 12: training itself is not reserved; a professional attestation of competence remains reserved. A professional opinion classifying non-compliance is covered by section 7, subject to the rights of engineers and other legally authorized persons preserved by section 9.
Section 9: the rights of engineers, members of other professional orders and other legally authorized persons are preserved under the stated conditions.

For OPSI, these exclusions are an element of proportionality: the proposal does not seek to reserve everything related to fire safety, but rather the acts identified as requiring particular professional accountability.

Article 4 Articles 7 à 12 Article 12

Conclusion

What the evidence file can establish today.

Available external sources already establish several of the characteristics examined under section 25 of the Professional Code.

The targeted activities require specialized technical knowledge. Several are performed with significant autonomy and produce conclusions that a non-specialist may find difficult to verify. The functions assessed concern systems and procedures whose failure can contribute to serious harm.

The Québec events presented do not show that a professional order would have prevented each of these tragedies. They do, however, show that certain real vulnerabilities directly concern activities the proposed professional field seeks to oversee.

The file does not contain a representative province-wide professional error rate because the information required to calculate one is not assembled in a common source. OPSI does not turn that unavailability into evidence. The assessment instead relies on converging evidence: exposure, technical complexity, observed deficiencies, documented cases, information asymmetry, current mechanisms and qualitative risk analysis. The trust factor remains more nuanced and confidentiality varies by mandate.

Data availability and evidence method Map the acts

Required knowledge

Standardized inspections, testing and interpretation.

Systems that interact.

The fire safety plan is a technical document.

A system cannot be understood merely by looking at its components.

Autonomy and difficulty of evaluation

The report becomes the interface of trust.

Alexis-Nihon: a document can exist without being technically sufficient.

Personal nature of the relationship and particular trust

Évaluer un risque sans inventerun taux qui n’existe pas.

Exposition

Complexité

Déficiences observées

Cas sentinelles

Asymétrie d’information

Surveillance professionnelle transversale

Assessing risk without inventinga rate that does not exist.

Exposure

Complexity

Observed deficiencies

Sentinel cases

Information asymmetry

Cross-cutting professional oversight

Seriousness of harm in the absence of professional control

Fire risk can lead to serious consequences.

Operation Vulcain — a targeted sample, not a province-wide frequency.

Connecting professional activity to a possible consequence.

Water supply, standpipe system and system knowledge.

32 deaths in a private seniors’ residence.

An emergency procedure can reveal a critical vulnerability.

A fire with major consequences, with the public inquiry still ongoing.

The intended mechanism is to interrupt the chain before harm occurs.

What mandatory reporting changes

Confidential nature of information

Some fire safety plans contain individualized information.

State of the evidence — Section 25

Section 26 — Why exclusive practice

The title alone does not control the act.

The risk extends beyond the parties to the contract.

A deliberately circumscribed reservation

What the evidence file can establish today.

Évaluer un risque sans inventer
un taux qui n’existe pas.

Assessing risk without inventing
a rate that does not exist.